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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH C. V. FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
Plaintiff and appellant
vs.

KAY D. JENKINS
Defendant
and
WILLIAM E. MEEKS AND JORJANNA
I. MEEKS his wife
Intervenors and Third Party
Plaintiffs and Respondent
vs.
UTAH C. V. FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
AND GOLDEN W. ROBBINS
Third Party Defendants and
Appellant

Case No.
13611

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
AND THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS
AND APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a Judgment lien. The judgment
was obtained in this case and became a lien upon defendant's real property. Execution was issued to sell the real
property. The intervenors, Meeks, got a temporary injunction in the case restraining the plaintiff, his attorney
and the sheriff from selling the property, claiming that
they were the bona fide purchaser for value of the prop1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

erty without notice relying upon an invalid Satisfaction of
Judgment which was not verified and was not signed
by the Plaintiff's attorney, which Satisfaction of Judgment
was vacated by the court.
That intervenors were allowed to intervene in this
action after Judgment and the court quieted title in intervenors.
DISPOSITION I N THE LOWER COURT
The court held that the Intervenors became the owners of the fee title to the property at the time when the
Satisfaction of Judgment was on file and before the Satisfaction had been vacated and quieted title in intervenors.

RELIEF SOUGHT O N APPEAL
Plaintiff asks for reversal of the Judgment and that
the court holds that the Judgment was a lien at all times
and that anyone dealing with the property was not a bona
fide purchaser for value, but took it subject to the lien
and that execution was properly issued.
That the abstract company and title company acting
through the Meeks could not bring an injunction.

STATEMENT OF FACT
Plaintiff obtained a Judgment on November 27,
1967 in the above case against Kay D. Jenkins. (R. 6).
Thereafter Supplemental Orders were issued. (R. 7). The
defendant was examined and as a result of the examina-
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tion it was found that he was the owner of the property in
Salt Lake County being Lot 14 Fairlane Heights Subdivision.
That on December 31, 19695 a Satisfaction of Judgment was filed without the signature of the Plaintiff's
attorney and without his knowledge or consent and it was
not verified. (R. 15). On May 14, 1970, a Motion to Set
Aside Satisfaction of Judgment was filed supported by
Affidavit. (R. 16-18). On May 26, 1970, an Order was
made setting aside and vacating the Satisfaction of Judgment. (R. 20).
An Execution was issued and given to the Sheriff
(R. 47-48-49-50), and the Sheriff levied upon the property at 14 Fairlane Heights Subdivision. That before the
date of the sale, an Order to Show Cause and Temporary
Restraining Order was issued enjoining and restraining
the Plaintiff and Plaintiff's attorney and the Sheriff from
continuing with the sale.
That Kay D. Jenkins was not served with any pleadings by Intervenor and did not appear in the action and
was not represented by any attorney.
The property was sold by Kay D. Jenkins to Wallace
J. Belnap, see Warranty Deed and Exhibit 21 Tpp. Page
31, dated September 30, 1969, Recorded March 17, 1970.
Wallace J. Belnap and his wife conveyed to William
E. Meeks and Jorjanna I. Meeks, his wife, by a Quit Claim
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Deed dated January 2, 1970, recorded March 17, 1970.
See Deposition of Jorjanna I. Meeks, Exhibit
and Exhibit 21 Tpp, Page 32.
That Kay D. Jenkins and his wife conveyed the property to William E. Meeks and Jorjanna I. Meeks, his wife,
by Warranty Deed dated September 30, 1969, acknowledged August 17, 1970, Recorded October 27, 1970. See
the Deed in the deposition of Jorjanna I. Meeks, Exhibit
and Exhibit 21 Tpp, Page 37. The Deed was notorized and recorded after the Satisfaction of Judgment had
been set aside and vacated.
Various Motions were filed and ruled on by various
Judges. The pleadings, Motions and ruling on them are
set out below:
An Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining
Order was issued Exparte (R. 32-35, R. 38-39). That intervenor also made a Motion to Intervene as Defendant
(R. 21-27).
Plaintiff filed a Motion Pertaining to the Order to
Show Cause, Temporary Restraining Order, and Motion to
Intervene, (R. 43), on the grounds that the Order to Show
Cause and Temporary Restraining Order failed to state
facts upon which relief could be granted. That it was
heard by the Court. That a Motion to reconsider was filed
September 17, 1971, (R. 64), and the final Memorandum
Decision was made by Judge Stewart M. Hanson on January 26, 1972 (R. 82), denying Plaintiff's Motion to Quash
and granting Defendant Motion to Intervene. Formal
Order signed and filed February 1, 1972, (R. 83-84).
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Plaintiff objected to the Order Granting Intervenors
Motion to Intervene and denying Plaintiff's Motion to
Quash. (R. 85).
That the Intervenor filed two Motions for Relief
from Judgment (R. 28-30) (R. 74-76). Plaintiff filed
Answer to Motion for Relief from Judgment and Motion
supported by Affidavit of Golden W . Robbins and Gloria
Garwood, (R. 68-73). Plaintiff and Intervenors filed
Motions for Summary Judgment (R. 87 and 89). That the
Intervener's Motion for Relief from Judgment and the
two Motions for Summary Judgment were heard before
Judge Earl M. Marshall, Judge Pro Tern, and the court
denied the three Motions, but the Order provided Intervenor could file a responsive pleading. Minute entry (R.
92-101). Formal Order (R. 103).
That the Intervenors filed a Motion to Reconsider
and Objections to Order (R. 96, 97, 99) of Judge Marshall.
Intervenor also filed a Motion to bring in Third Party
Defendant and file Third Party Complaint. (R. 111).
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Intervenors Motion
to Bring in Third Party Defendant and to file Third Party
Complaint. (R. 115-116), and filed a Brief. (R. 117-130).
The Court made an Order granting the Motion to
Bring in Third Party Defendant, as to Golden W . Robbins
only and no other parties added or joined in these proceedings. Minute Entry (R. 131). Formal Order (R. 133).

5
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Objections to the said Order allowing Golden W*
Robbins to be joined as party and that there should be
no additional parties. (R. 134-135). Brief submitted by
Intervenor.
Final Order, (R. 154-155), joining Golden W . Robbins as a party to the action and providing, "It is further
ordered there shall be no additional parties added or
joined in these proceedings." (R. 154-155).
Objections to Proposed Order. (R. 156-157).
Objections Defenses and Answer to Third Party Complaint filed by Golden W . Robbins (R. 161-164).
Objections, Defenses and Answer to Third Party
Complaint by Plaintiff (R. 165-167).
That the Plaintiff, by his Answer and other pleadings,
raised certain issues and at the beginning of the trial also
raised objections and issues as follows: (R. 161-164) and
R. 249-269)
1. That the issue in this case is whether or not a
valid release of Judgment was executed and whether an
execution can issue.
2. That the purported Satisfaction of Judgment relied on by Intervenors in this case, (R. 15), which is Exhibit 3 T P P and attached to the Intervenors Brief, (R.
138) did not amount to a satisfaction of Judgment.
3. The court does not have jurisdiction and it was
not proper in the action to interject an injunction suit into

6
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this case and there were no facts upon which an injunction
could be granted. (R. 161).
4. That the Court does not have jurisdiction and it
was not proper in this action to interplead third-party defendant for the purpose of quieting title. (R. 161) That
the court erred in allowing the Intervenors to intervene.
5. That the Court erroneously made an Order preventing this answering defendant from making the McGhie Land Title Company and Lawyers Title Insurance
Corporation party defendants. (R. 161)
6. That the defendant, Kay D. Jenkins, had none of
the pleadings served upon him. That he was a necessary
party to these proceedings (R. 249-250 and R. 260)
7. That a stranger to this lawsuit has no right to
enjoin the plaintiff in this case. (R. 254)
8. There was never any estoppel plead and no facts
to support an estoppel in this case. That the Judgment was
always in the clerk's office with the name of the attorney
on it and never satisfied by the attorney and always giving
notice (R. 256, Line 14).
9. Plaintiff contends that all issues raised by the
pleadings and raised at the beginning of the Trial should
have been considered and decided by the trial court (R.
258 line 19-23). After these issues were raised, the court
was of the erroneous opinion that because of the filing of
the purported Satisfaction of Judgment that plaintiff and
his counsel lost the right to issue execution. The court
erroneously thought that the Third Party Plaintiff can
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nevertheless rely upon an invalid Satisfaction of Judgment. (R. 263-264)
The Meeks relied upon the McGhie Land Title Company and the insurance Company, Lawyers Title Insurance
Corporation the same as a person would rely upon an
attorneys opinion on an abstract. They did not know anything about what was in the record. Mrs. Meeks testified as follows:
McGhie Land Title Company was to furnish a
good title to the property to the Meeks. (P. 316)
On Page 316 of the transcript it says:
Q: "And they were to furnish you with a good title
to this property, the McGhie Land Title Company ?"
A:

"Yes, but I didn't understand the document and"

Q: "You have been relying on that title to this
property and that you had a good insurance policy protecting you from any lien on this property. You have a
policy that does that?"
A:

"Yes. yes."

Q: And that was issued and that is the policy which
is in evidence? Is that correct?
A:

"Yes"

McGhie Land Title Company took care of all recording (P. 305)
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That the McGhie Land Title Company and the Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation are the ones who have
been taking care of this suit as they should under their
policy and Mrs. Meeks testified as follows:
McGhie Land Title Company sent Mrs. Meeks to
Earl Staten (R. 311)
Mrs. Meeks went to see Mr. Larsen at McGhie Land
Title Company in June (R. 313).
The Title Company told the Meeks Mr. Staten was
to handle the lawsuit.
The Meeks brought in execution to McGhie Land
Title Company (R. 314)
Mr. Larsen of the McGhie Land Title Company told
Mr. Meeks that the title Company would take care of the
lawsuit and Mr. Staten would handle it. (R. 314 and 315)
Q: "Now you have never paid an attorney fee to
Mr. Staten and you have never promised to pay an attorney fee?"
A:

"No, we have not. (R. 316)"

That Wallace C. McDermaid was vice president of
McGhie Land Title Company and testified that they closed
the deal and that they were paid and they issued a policy
of title insurance in the Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation insuring the fee simple title in the Meeks. At the
time of trial he had the file of McGhie Land Title Company in which there was a report from the Pioneer Title
9
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Company showing the Judgment entered in the above
entitled case. (R. 336, Exhibit 22 TPD). He further testified:
Q: "And you were representing the Meeks to see
that they had good title?" (R. 337).
A:

"Yes."

Q: "And they would not have a good title unless
that" (judgment of the Plaintiff) "was satisfied?"
A:

"That's right." (R. 337)

Q: "And all the rest of the responsibility is yours
in bringing the search of the title and seeing that the title
is good?" (R. 343)
A: "That's right. As agent for them it was the responsibility of the Company, not necessarily mine."
Q: "And all the rest of the responsibility is yours in
making the search of the title and seeing that the title
is good?"
A: "That's right, as agent for them it's a responsibility of the Company, not necessarily mine." (R. 343).
He testified that there was no name of the attorney
on the release.
Q: "This was in your deposition? I call your attention to where it says: Attorney for the Judgment creditor.
There is no name or signature there is there?" See Exhibit
3TPP
A:

"No." (R. 344)

10
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He did not make a search in the Clerk's office (R. 344)
Further Question: "But you didn't bother to go to
the Clerk's office?"
A:

"No." (R. 345)

And he testified that Exhibit 3 TPP, he relied on
the original and it doesn't show any attorney signed it.
(R. 346, Exhibit 3 TPP).
That at the close of Intervenors evidence, Plaintiff
made a Motion for Dismissal, (R 352-353) which was
denied by the court.
Golden W. Robbins was sworn and testified that a
letter was mailed by him to McGhie Land Title company
dated January 28, 1970 stating that he had Judgment,
(R. 358, Exhibit 24 TPD) which letter was mailed before
there was any closing or conveyance to the Meeks.
Letter to Mr. William E. Meeks, Exhibit 18 TPD,
dated April 24, 1970 setting out that he had a Judgment,
which letter was mailed before they received the Deed
from Kay D. Jenkins and before they had paid all the
money to Belnaps and to the Mortgage Company.
Letter to Earl Staten from Attorney Robbins setting
out the amount due on the Judgment. (R. 359, Exhibit
26 TPD)
Intervenors contend they never received Notice of
Motion to Set aside Satisfaction of Judgment.
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There is in the file of McGhie Land Title Company
an envelope of Golden W. Robbins post marked May 13,
1970 addressed to the Meeks, Exhibit 23 TPP. This undoubtedly was the enevelope in which the Meeks received
a copy of the Motion to Set Aside the Satisfaction of Judgment (R. 16), certificate by Golden W. Robbins that the
Motion to Set Aside Satisfaction of Judgment was mailed
on May 13, 1970.
That Attorney Robbins testified that he had the case
on a contingent basis.
That Attorney Robbins filed a Counter Claim.
Attorney Robbins testified that the work he had done
in this case was reasonably worth $5,000.00.
That the Third Party Defendant, Golden W. Robbins
felt it was necessary to set out his claim for damages and
ask for an attorney fee, but he told the court that he
thought that this matter was not properly in the law suit
but should be heard after the main case was disposed of
(R365).

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

NO VALID SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT. THE ATTORNEY'S LIEN WAS NOT
WAIVED. EXECUTION SHOULD HAVE ISSUED. INTERVENORS WERE NOT BONA
FIDE PURCHASERS FOR VALUE. THERE
WAS NO ESTOPPEL.
12
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The court held that the Meeks, Intervenors, relied on
the Record and were bona fide purchasers for value without Notice actually or constructively and the Satisfaction
had been entered upon the docket of the court pursuant
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58 B(d) and ceased
to be a lien until the Satisfaction of Judgment was vacated
and that the lien could not then attach for the reason that
the fee title was no longer in the Judgment Debtor, but
had become vested in the Meeks. (R. 225)
It is our contention that the court erred in so holding
for the following reasons:.
That the Meeks did not get a Warranty Deed from
the Judgment Debtor, Kay D. Jenkins until after the Satisfaction of Judgment had been set aside. (R. 20)
Apparently the Belnaps had some question about the
liens because they gave a Quit Claim Deed that was recorded on March 17, 1970 from Belnaps to Meeks, but it
was only a quit claim deed and at the time the Belnaps got
their deed all they got was title subject to the lien of the
Plaintiff and when they conveyed to the Meeks, all they
conveyed was what they had and the fee title was not conveyed to the Meeks, but it was subject to any and all liens.
There was always Notice that the Plaintiff's attorney had a lien and that he had not satisfied the Judgment.
The Law is clear in the state of Utah. That parties
cannot abbrogate or disregard the attorney's lien.
Section 78-22-1 provides:
13
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"LIEN OF JUDGMENT — From the time the
judgment is docketed it becomes a lien upon all the
real property of the Judgment debtor * * * *
The attorney is the only one who can give a valid
release of the lien. The release was not valid. The release
was not authorized. The abstract and title companies well
knew that there was an attorney's lien which io created by
virtue of section 78-51-41, which is as follows:
"78-51-41. Compensation — Lien —. The compensation of an attorney and counselor for his services is governed by agreement, express or implied,
or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a
lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attached to a verdict, report, decision
or judgment in his client's favor and to the proceeds thereof in whosever hands they may come
and cannot be affected by any settlement between
the parties before or after judgment."
In the 1973 Supplement, Utah Code, under 78-51-41,
page 107, it states:
"Where plaintiff's attorney was to receive a contingent fee of 1/3 of whatever was obtained from
the defendant, whether money or property and the
judgment obtained was satisfied by a sheriff's sale
of defendant's realty to plaintiff in which plaintiffs bid was less than the amount owed on the
judgment by defendant, plaintiffs attorney held a
1/3 interest in the land plaintiff purchased since
the land was paid for with the judgment debt, 1/3
of which belonged to the attorney. Petrie v. General Contracting Co., 17 U. (2d) 408, 413 P. 2d
600."

14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

And quoting from the case itself as follows, on page
601, bottom of second column, it says:
"Sec. 78-51-41 UCA, 1953 provides that an attorney, * * * has a lien upon his client's * * *
judgment * * and to the proceeds thereof * * *.
Where the recovery is real estate the lien attaches
to it; and this is also true where real estate is taken
in satisfaction of a judgment."
Under Section 78-51-41 with many other cases is
annotated the case of Jeffries v. Third Judicial Dist. Court,
63 P2d 242, 90 U 2d 525, at page 244 of the Pacific, it
states under note (2), second column:
"In construing this statute, this court, through a
long line of cases, has repeatedly held that an attorney may prosecute his client's cause of action to
judgment and his client's name, solely for the purpose of protecting his lien for the amount of his
fee in the case, and that his lien may not be defeated by a settlement efefcted without his consent. Sandberg v. Victor, etc. Mining Co. 18 Utah,
66, 55 P 74; Victor Gold & Silver Mining Co., v.
National Bank, etc. 18 Utah, 87, 55 P. 72, 72 Am.
St. Rep. 767; Croco v. Oregon S.L.R.R. Co., 18
Utah, 311, 54 P. 985, 44 LRA. 285; Potter v. Ajax
Mining Co. 19 Utah 421, 57 P. 270; Potter v. Ajax
Mining Co., 22 Utah, 273 61 P. 999; Broadbent v.
Denver & R.G. Ry. Co. 48 Utah, 598, 160 P. 1185;
Lundy v. Cappucio, 54 Utah, 420, 181 P. 165;
Mountain States Supply Co. v. Nuttall-Allen Co.,
63 Utah, 384, 225 P. 811.
In Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 19 Utah, 421, at
page 430, 57 P. 270-272, Supra, this court in considering the same statute, said: "the language * * *
is comprehensive, and creates a direct lien in favor
of the attorney upon his client's cause of action,
15
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in whatever form it may arrume, in the entire
course of litigation and entitled the attorney to
follow the proceeds, without regard to any settlement before or after the judgment. It being a statutory lien, every one must take notice of it, and
any one settling with the client without the knowledge of the attorney does so at his own risk."
One of the cases set out in the citation above is the
case of Potter v. Ajax Mining Company 61 P. 999 and is a
case in which a settlement was made with the defendant
by plaintiff's attorney and a satisfaction filed. A Motion
was made to set aside the Satisfaction of Judgment. On
page 1000, close to the top of the first column, it states:
"Upon a hearing, the court made an order setting
aside the dismissal of said action and allowing said
attorney to prosecute said cause of action for the
purpose of determining the amount of their fees
and expenses."
And on page 1001, towards the bottom of the second
column, the court says:
"an agreement between attorneys and their client
that they are to be paid for their services rendered
in the prosecution of a suit and reimbursed for
money advanced from the proceeds of the judgment which should be obtained, operates as an
assignment, of the judgment to the attorney to the
extent of such claim and until the same are paid
the plaintiff can give no valid discharge of the
Judgment."
W e have Rule 58 B(d) entitled Satisfaction of Judgment and we quote:
"(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A Judgment may be satisfied in whole or in part as to
16
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any or all of the judgment debtors by the owner
thereof or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor. * * by written instrument duly
acknowledged by such owner or attorney."
Rule 58 B(d) and section 78-51-41 (The attorney's
lien section) must be construed together and when read in
the light of the quotation from the case of Ajax supra:
"operates as an assignment of the Judgment to the
attorney to the extent of such claim and until the
same are paid the plaintiff can give no valid discharge of the judgment."
Rule 58 B(d) says that the owner or attorney. The
Plaintiff is not the owner of the Judgment until the attorney's lien is paid or discharged and the attorney is the only
person who can give a valid Satisfaction until his lien
is paid.
I want to call the court's attention to what is said
in Potter v. Ajax Mining, supra, "It being a statutory lien,
everyone must take notice."
The McGhie Land Title Company and the Lawyers
Title Insurance Corporation and their customer ,the Meeks
were bound to take notice of the Attorney's statutory lien.

POINT

II

N O GROUNDS FOR AN INJUNCTION.
ERROR T O ALLOW INTERVENORS T O INTERVENE I N THE SUIT. McGHIE LAND
TITLE COMPANY A N D LAWYERS TITLE
INSURANCE CORPORATION WERE THE
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST, BUT IF THE
17
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ISSUE OF TITLE WAS T O BE TRIED THE
ABSTRACT COMPANY AND THE TITLE
COMPANY SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE
PARTIES. PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY ALWAYS H A D A LIEN AND WAS ALWAYS
ENTITLED T O ISSUE EXECUTION.
The McGhie Land Title Company and the Lawyers
Title Insurance Corporation through the Meeks, a subsequent buyer, should have not been allowed to intervene
in a suit between plaintiff and defendant after judgment
and after an execution regular on its face has been levied
upon the property which said property was owned by the
judgment debtor at the time of the entry of the judgment.
Section pertaining to Judgment lien is 78-22-1, and we
quote:
"78-22-1. LIEN OF JUDGMENT — From the
time the judgment is docketed it becomes a lien
upon all the real property of the judgment debtor,
not exempt from execution, in the county in which
the judgment is entered, owned by him at the time
or by him thereafter acquired during the existence
of said lien. * * * The lien shall continue for
eight years unless the judgment is previously satisfied or unless the enforcement of the judgment is
stayed on appeal by the execution of a sufficient
undertaking as provided by law, in which case
the lien of the judgment ceases."
This is not a case of parties intervening prior to judgment, but is after judgment. That there is no rule or
statute dealing with pleadings or relief after judgment
other than Rule 60, which provides for relief from judgments or orders. Section 60 states:
"On Motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice, relieve a
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party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons * * * such as excusable neglect."
This section says party not subsequent purchaser of
property covered by judgment lien.
The section which deals with execution and proceedings supplement thereto is Rule 69 and it provides:
"ISSUANCE OF W R I T OF EXECUTION. Process
to enforce a judgment shall be by a Writ of Execution unless the court otherwise directs, which may
issue at any time within eight years after the entry
of judgment # * # #"
W e submit that this section does not allow the bringing of a distinct and separate cause of action by subsequent purchase against the plaintiff in the original action.
The attempt of the subsequent purchaser to come into this
lawsuit is not a matter of procedure, but is a matter of
substantive law. We maintain that neither the new rules
nor the statute has changed, but the law has been for years
that a third party not a party to the action in which the
execution has issued, cannot intervene in the original
action.
W e submit to the court that the intervenors could not
intervene in this action and we quote 23 C. J. at page 583
section 505 which says:
"505.2 Intervention in original action.
A third person, not a party to the action in which
execution has issued, cannot intervene in the original action to claim property levied on under execution in such action where there is no statute authorizing such procedure."
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Volume 17 Pacific Digest, 101 P.2d Execution, Section 1635 they quote a California case as follows:
"Cal. App. No one except judgment debtor may
move to quash a writ of execution or levy thereon
unless the judgment upon which it is issued is, or
the writ is, void on its face, — Blue v. Superior
Court, Los Angeles County, 305 P.2d 209, 147
C. A. 2d 278."
The case of Blue v. Superior Court, 305 P.2d 209, on
page 213 of the Pacific Reporter, bottom of first column
and top of second says:
"It is further established that no one except the
judgment debtor may move to quash a writ of
execution or the levy thereof unless the judgment
upon which it is issued, is or the writ is void on its
face. Associated Oil Co. v. Mullin, 110 Cal. App.
385, 392, 294 P. 421; Vest v. Superior Court, 140
Cal. App. 2d 91, 93, 294 P. 2d 988. A Levy cannot
be quashed on the grounds that the judgment
debtor has no interest in the property levied upon
Vest v. Superior Court, supra, 140 Cal. App. 2d at
page 93, 294 P. 2d 988, and cases there cited, and
the court may not, in a proceeding had pursuant to
the provisions of the Civil Code above referred to,
define the interest of the judgment debtor in the
property levied upon, or turn the proceeding into
a plenary suit in equity in the nature of a creditor's
bill. Strangman v. Duke, 140 Cal. App. 2d 185,
192, 295 P.2d 12."
And further on page 213 Section 6 it states:
"the purchaser at the execution sale will acquire
only such interest as the judgment debtor had in
the property; and he may if he chooses take no further steps to perfect his title and await action by
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anyone claiming adversely, or may himself sue to
quiet title against such adverse claims. Strangman
v. Duke, supra, 140 Cal. App. 2d at pages 191,
192, 295 P. 2d 12."
In the case of Associated Oil Co. vs. Mullin, 294 P.
421 cited above on page 424 of the Pacific it states as
follows:
"In the present case, however, the judgment is
valid upon its face, and the execution issued thereon was regular in form. Under such circumstances
it is well settled that the court has no power to
vacate an execution for the omissions or acts of the
sheriff after the writ has duly come into his hands.
23 C.J. Executions, §424, P. 540. Hence it has been
held that a levy upon property exempt from execution is not a reason for recalling the writ (Roth v.
Insley, 86 Cal. 134, 24 P. 853) nor can the levy
be quashed on the ground that the judgment debtor
has no interest in the property levied upon, as
strangers to the action have means provided by law
for protecting their rights (23 C.J. Executions,
§ 285, P. 470; Bancroft Code Practice and Remedies, § 1999, P. 2630).
And the case above cited of Vest v. Superior Court,
294 P.2d on page 990 it states:
"Petitioner contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in quashing the writ of execution. It is
the general rule that none but the parties to the
action who are liable to be injured can move for
recall of the writ, 23 C. J., Executions, sec. 426,
P. 541, 33 C.J.S. Executions, § 144, unless the judgment upon which it issued or the writ is void on its
face. * * * * i n the present case, however, the
judgment is valid upon its face, and the execution
issued thereon was regular in form, Under such
circumstances it is well settled that the court has
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no power to vacate an execution for the omissions
or acts of the sheriff after the writ has duly come
into his hands, 23 C.J., Executions, Sec. 424, P.
540, 33 C.J.S. Executions, § 143. Hence it has been
held that a levy upon property exempt from execution is not a reason for recalling the writ, Roth v.
Insley, quashed on the ground that the judgment
debtor has no interest in the property levied upon,
as strangers to the action have means provided by
law for protecting their rights, 23 C.J., Executions,
Sec. 285, p. 470, 33 C.J.S., Executions, § 109; Bancroft Code Practice and Remedies, Sec. 1999, p.
2630. Associated Oil Co. v. Mullin, 110 Cal. App.
385, 392, 294 P. 421; Roth v. Insley, 86 Cal. 134,
24 P. 853, 11 Cal. Juris § 58, 64."
At 33 C.J.S. Section 144 (c) they cite the case of Lexington Land Co. v. Ambrister, and in 64 P.2d 703, 179
Oklahoma 86 and on page 705 of the Pacific, bottom of
second paragraph we quote:
"This question has had the attention of a number
of courts whose conclusion is aptly stated in 23
Corpus Juris, 470, where the following appears in
summary; "A Motion to quash the levy is not a
proper proceeding to try the question of title to
property, and the court will not set aside a levy
upon the motion of a party solely on the ground
that the officer has seized property of a stranger to
the writ, or on the ground that the judgment debtor
has no interest in the property levied on. So
the court will not entertain a motion by a
stranger, whose property has been levied upon, to
vacate the levy, because the court will not in this
manner determine conflicting titles to property;
the stranger will be left to the statutory method of
trying his right to the property/'
The foregoing is taken from Corpus Juris. There are
other cases cited under this section in Corpus Juris and
we quote from 33 C.J.S. Sec. 144 (e) p. 332:
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"Except as statutes provide otherwise, ordinarily
none but parties to the principal action who are
liable to be injured may move to quash the execution. The court may act on its own motion in the
case of a void writ."
W e know of no rule or statute which has changed
the substantive law that we have quoted above and we
have found no case in which the rule has been changed.
CONCLUSIONS
W e submit that there was never a valid release issued.
That the Meeks relied upon the McGhie Land Title Company and Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation and the
Title Insurance Policy and the Meeks would have recourse
against the Title Company and as a practical matter they
are being taken care of by the Title Company. That the
McGhie Land Title Company and Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation knew they had to have a release from
the attorney and they were responsible for the Title and
that they either took a calculated risk or were negligent
in not checking the record and contacting the attorney for
the Plaintiff.
We submit that no valid release was given and there
was no estoppel and that no injunction should have been
issued and that execution should issue.
Respectfully submitted,
GOLDEN W. ROBBINS AND
WILLIAM H. HENDERSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Third Party
Defendants and Appellant
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